Wednesday, October 13, 2004
En Bolivia nunca sufrimos una dictadura comunista, pero pareciera que hubiera un politburo que dictaminara los libros que deben haber en las librerias o universidades.
Todos los que han pasado materias de Economía en la universidad han escuchado hablar de Adam Smith. Bueno, Estuve buscando entre los libros piratas, y no pude encontrar UNA sola copia del clásico: La riqueza de las naciones. Si encontré una copia del manifiesto comunista y unas cuantas sobre la vida del Che y un libros escritos por Michael Moore y Rosa Luxemburgo, entre otros muchos que criticaban o al libre mercado o a los USA.
Si no se puede encontrar Adam Smith, mucho mas dificil sera encontrar a muchos otros pensadores modernos del liberalismo economico.
Friederick Hayek, John S. Mill, Milton & Rose Friedman, y otros tantos son desconocidos incluso para los más renombrados catedraticos. Y luego me dicen que me han lavado el cerebro...
Siendo la primera potencia militar y económica del mundo, Estados Unidos tiene el deber de guiar. El presidente Bush ha descuidado esta obligación. ¡Olvídense de Irak! El cambio climático cobrará la cuenta a Bush, especialmente si vuelve a ser reelecto el mes entrante y persiste en su política de bloqueo ecológico cuatro años más.”
The Guardian, de Londres, apunta: “Durante meses, Tony Blair argumentó que aunque Irak no haya poseído armas prohibidas, tenía programas para desarrollarlas. Ahora resulta que tampoco había tales programas. La principal justificación de la guerra esgrimida tanto en Washington como en Londres ha demostrado ser infundada. (...) El informe contiene una salvedad significativa. Ésta consiste en afirmar que Saddam se proponía volver a hacerse de armas tras el término de las sanciones. Los fundamentos de esa aseveración -basada en conversaciones con científicos iraquíes prisioneros y los propios antiguos líderes de Bagdad-, son incompletos y despiertan falsas expectativas. Quizá Saddam haya tenido la idea, pero el informe indica que no se descubrió ninguna estrategia dirigida a llevarla a la práctica.”
Der Standard, de Viena, comenta: “Un año y medio tardó en presentar sus resultados el grupo de inspectores estadounidenses, que contó con un número de integrantes con el que sólo podía soñar el equipo de la ONU que trabajó en Irak antes de la guerra, suplicando por más tiempo. El hecho de que Bush no haya impedido que el informe se hiciera público faltando menos de un mes para las elecciones presidenciales, demuestra una vez más cuán poca legitimación creía y cree necesitar: primero fueron armas, luego programas y ahora (el informe dice que la investigación y desarrollo de armas habían cesado) simplemente la intención. En relación con la palabra mágica ‘terrorismo’, eso todavía funciona.”
El post no era para dar razones para justificar a la guerra, pero ya que estamos... Saddam tuvo armas de destrucción masiva , las usó, violó sanciones de las Naciones Unidas, atacó en 2 oportunidades a sus vecinos, amenazaba constantemente a los EEUU y la Unión Europea, y se mantuvo en el poder durante mas de 20 años como un dictador brutal. Las armas no se encontraron, bueno, eso se sabe ahora. Se pueden criticar las razones para ir a la guerra, pero no se puede defender a Saddam Hussein. Defender a Saddam Hussein bajo la idea de que toda guerra es mala es cinico, ingenuo y soportado por un anti-americanismo irracional.
El informe de Duelfer no da razones para destituir a Blair o a Bush, sino que más bien pone en claro el escándalo de corrupción en la ONU, y totalmente desenmascara el cinismo de los gobiernos de Francia y Alemania.
Todos los periódicos que citaste son Europeos, y daría la impresión que los europeos estuvieran en total desacuerdo con los EEUU y GB, pero en realidad solo 8 países de los veinticinco se opusieron a la invasión (9 ahora que se le sumó el tarado de Zapatero).
Saddam era una amenaza para la seguridad de el MUNDO y era un dictador brutal y muy peligroso, y eso no lo digo porque "Bush lo haya dicho" (y no solo Bush, también muchos otros líderes mundiales entre ellos socialistas); removerlo de su comoda posición de gobierno era algo justo y necesario.
Friday, Oct. 8, 2004 11:16 a.m. EDT
No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq? Not Exactly
Is it really true that Saddam Hussein had no "stockpiles" of weapons of mass destruction before the U.S. invaded in March 2003?
Not exactly - at least not if one counts the 500 tons of uranium that the Iraqi dictator kept stored at his al Tuwaitha nuclear weapons development plant.
The press hasn't made much of Saddam's 500 ton uranium stockpile, downplaying the story to such an extent that most Americans aren't even aware of it.
But it's been reported - albeit in a by-the-way fashion - by the New York Times and a handful of other media outlets. And one of Saddam's nuclear scientists, Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, admitted to the BBC earlier this year, "We had 500 tons of yellow cake [uranium] in Baghdad."
Surely 500 tons of anything qualifies as a "stockpile." And press reports going back more than a decade give no indication that weapons inspectors had any idea the Iraqi dictator had amassed such a staggering amount of nuke fuel until the U.S. invaded.
That's when the International Atomic Energy Agency was finally able to take a full inventory, and suddenly the 500 ton figure emerged.
Still, experts say Saddam's massive uranium stockpile was largely benign.
Largely? Well, except for the 1.8 tons of uranium that Saddam had begun to enrich. The U.S. Energy Department considered that stockpile so dangerous that it mounted an unprecedented airlift operation four months ago to remove the enriched uranium stash from al Tuwaitha.
But didn't most of that enrichment take place before the first Gulf War - with no indication whatsoever that Saddam was capable of proceeding any further towards his dream of acquiring the bomb?
That seems to be the consensus. But there's also disturbing evidence to the contrary.
David Kay, the former chief U.S. weapons inspector who was hailed by the press last year for pronouncing Iraq WMD-free, shared some interesting observations with Congress this past January about goings-on at al Tuwaitha in 2000 and 2001.
"[The Iraqis] started building new buildings, renovating it, hiring some new staff and bringing them together," Kay said. "And they ran a few physics experiments, re-ran experiments they'd actually run in the '80s."
"Fortunately, from my point of view," he added, "Operation Iraqi Freedom intervened and we don't know how or how fast that would have gone ahead. . . . Given their history, it was certainly an emerging program that I would not have looked forward to their continuing to pursue."
Kay's successor, Charles Duelfer, has also confirmed that nuclear research at al Tuwaitha was continuing right up until the U.S. invasion, telling Congress in March that Saddam's scientists were "preserving and expanding [their] knowledge to design and develop nuclear weapons."
One laboratory at al Tuwaitha, Duelfer said, "was intentionally focused on research applicable for nuclear weapons development."
Still, most experts say that Iraq was nowhere near being able to produce nuclear weapons, which is a good thing, considering how much raw material Saddam had to work with.
Writing in the London Evening Standard earlier this year, Norman Dombey, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Sussex, walked his readers through a simple calculation:
"You have a warehouse containing 500 tons of natural uranium; you need 25 kilograms of U235 to build one weapon. How many nuclear weapons can you build? The answer is 142."
Fortunately for the world, Saddam didn't have the nuclear enrichment technology to convert his 500 ton uranium stockpile into weapons grade bombmaking material. Or did he?
After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad last year, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program until 1997, had some disturbing news for coalition debriefers.
He kept blueprints for a nuclear centrifuge, along with some actual centrifuge components, stored at his home - buried in the front yard - awaiting orders from Baghdad to proceed.
"I had to maintain the program to the bitter end," Obeidi said recently. His only other choice was death.
In his new book, "The Bomb in My Garden," the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted Saddam's bombmaking program.
"The centrifuge is the single most dangerous piece of nuclear technology," he writes. "With advances in centrifuge technology, it is now possible to conceal a uranium enrichment program inside a single warehouse."
Last week Dr. Obeidi warned in a New York Times op-ed piece that Saddam could have restarted his nuclear program "with a snap of his fingers."
Perhaps the 500 ton stockpile of nuclear fuel that Saddam kept at al Tuwaitha wasn't quite as benign as our media likes to pretend.
The U.N.’s Greatest Failure
Saddam’s Iraq evidently passed Turtle Bay’s global test.
By Andrew Apostolou
Wednesday's report by Charles Duelfer demonstrated not only that United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq were a bust, but also the fundamental failure of the U.N. system. Consistently, the U.N. conceded and compromised, while Saddam Hussein corrupted and connived. Instead of containing and disarming Saddam, the U.N. became his lobbyist and financier.
The U.N. resolved to disarm Saddam in April 1991 after U.S.-led forces ejected the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The sanctions imposed on Iraq for invading Kuwait in 1990 were maintained to give the Iraqi regime an incentive to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors. Inspection teams were to dismantle Iraqi WMD programs and stocks, a process expected to take, at most, a couple of years.
The problem with this system was that it was run by the U.N. in cooperation with Saddam, a man as cunning as he is brutal. Saddam's instinctive ability to spot weakness served him well against the U.N. Time and again, Saddam absorbed the initial blows — the sanctions and the weapons inspections — and then turned them to his advantage. The U.N. could not give in, or accept the bribes, fast enough.
In its battle against economic sanctions, the Iraqi regime could hardly claim to be the wronged party. So Saddam found the best victims a propagandist could hope for: children. The Iraqi regime, itself guilty of genocide against its Kurdish and Shia Arab citizens, loudly complained that U.N. sanctions had killed half a million Iraqi children. Bogus numbers were backed by footage of mass funerals — of corteges filled with tiny coffins. In fact, the regime collected dead babies in morgues until it had enough bodies for a televised group burial.
The propaganda drumbeat worked, and the U.N. Security Council caved in. Pressure from Arab states and Saddam's main arms suppliers and strategic allies — France, China, and Russia — forced a rethinking of the sanctions. Then-U.N. Undersecretary-General Kofi Annan, with the U.S. and Britain, came up with the Oil-for-Food program. Iraq was to sell oil under U.N. supervision, with the U.N. then releasing the revenues to pay for imports of humanitarian goods. Oil-for-Food proved to be one of those elegant proposals that diplomats think are cleverly creative but that Saddam found financially lucrative.
Before long every crook in the Middle East, along with carpetbaggers from China, France, and Russia, had his snout in the Oil-for-Food trough. Official oil sales became an elaborate kickback scheme. The U.N. and Iraq stretched the definition of "humanitarian goods" well beyond vital food and pharmaceuticals to include a sports stadium for Saddam's son, the serial rapist Uday Hussein. The Iraqi Kurds, who first alerted the world to the Oil-for-Food corruption, were systematically ripped off to the tune of $4 billion with U.N. connivance.
Saddam turned Oil-for-Food into the best oil lobby since Prince Bandar arrived in Washington. Money skimmed off of U.N.-supervised oil sales ended up with men like Shakir al-Khafaji, an Iraqi American in Michigan. Al-Khafaji provided former U.N. arms inspector Scott Ritter with $400,000 to make the anti-sanctions film In Shifting Sands. Oil-for-Food money rewarded French, Chinese, and Russian companies for their governments' loyalty in arguing Iraq's case at the U.N.
While U.N. officials today blame Saddam for the Oil-for-Food fiasco, the record shows that they were willing accomplices. Some officials were bribed. Benon Sevan, the head of the U.N. Oil-for-Food program, was paid off through an offshore company in Panama. Others opposed the very policies they were meant to implement. Successive U.N. humanitarian coordinators in Iraq, Denis Halliday (September 1997-October 1998) and Hans von Sponeck (October 1998-March 2000), resigned their posts to campaign against U.N. sanctions.
In contrast to the feckless Oil-for-Food overseers, the weapons inspectors began impressively and effectively. Led by Rolf Ekeus — a Swedish leftist whom Saddam despised and wanted to assassinate — from 1991 to 1997, the inspectors exposed covert Iraqi weapons programs. After years of Iraqi denials and deception, with help from Saddam's disgruntled son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, they opened up Saddam's biological-weapons research.
Such success was intolerable for Saddam and in 1998 he forced the inspectors out. After Britain and the U.S. bombed Iraq, the U.N. Security Council backed down. Keen to keep France, China, and Russia on board, the U.S. and Britain agreed to weaker inspections, offering to suspend sanctions if Saddam cooperated. France, China, and Russia refused to back the offer, abstaining when it came to a vote in the U.N. Security Council. Then, instead of allowing the dogged Ekeus to return as chief arms inspector, the French put forward Hans Blix, the retired and ineffective head of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under Blix's IAEA watch, rogue states had pursued clandestine nuclear programs.
Blix was a WMD Mr. Magoo. He knew Saddam was lying about surrendering his WMD programs, but as Blix admits in his memoirs, he kept that thought to himself. Despite all the evidence found by the U.S. of clandestine labs and illegal missile deals with North Korea, Blix says that Saddam had disarmed. Given more time, Blix would have given Saddam a clean bill of health and the green light for lifting sanctions. Yet Duelfer has revealed that Saddam could produce mustard gas in months and nerve agents in under a year.
Equally culpable was Mohammed El Baradei, the current IAEA chief. El Baradei told the U.N. Security Council on January 27, 2003, that "we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons program." Yet in the New York Times on September 26, 2004, Iraqi nuclear scientist Mahdi Obeidi wrote that "our nuclear program could have been reinstituted at the snap of Saddam Hussein's fingers...Iraqi scientists had the knowledge and the designs needed to jumpstart the program if necessary."
So, why did Saddam not restart his nuclear program? Obeidi says that Saddam was profiting too handsomely from Oil-for-Food to risk fiddling with nukes just yet. That sums up the U.N. in Iraq: Its final contribution was an aid program so corrupt that it briefly made Saddam's greed get the better of his ambitions.
— Andrew Apostolou is director of research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
VISITEN MI NUEVO SITE.!!
solo era eso, Gracias.!
Tambien es muy facil encontrar "Estúpidos hombres blancos" de Michael Moore hasta en la más pequeña libreria o puesto ambulante; lo que me deja pensando... ¿Será que Michael Moore ha sido un personaje más influyente en nuestro mundo que Adam Smith y Friederick Hayek????????? Realmente no lo creo.
Ah! y otra cosa, el catedrático de anatomía no tiene porque saber quien es Hernando Soto o John S. Mill; pero un catedrático de ECONOMIA, que es muy conocido y respetado en el medio pienso que al menos debe saber quienes son ellos.
Perdon entonces, ni en una gran libreria, ni entre libros truchos. Tal vez se encontraría a Adam Smith entre los piratas si es que lo pidiesen en la universidad...
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Dancer In The Dark